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AMNESIA AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
DONALD

I.

H.

HERMANN*

AMNESIA: IT'S NATURE AND EFFECT

Amnesia is a partial or complete inability to recall past events.'
This inability is not the result of an organic mental disorder but is
rather a form of dissociative disorder.' Amnesia is the most common
form of dissociative disorder and is characterized by a sudden, and
usually temporary, alteration of the integrative functions of consciousness. 3 When the alteration occurs in consciousness, important personal
events or other experiences cannot be recalled.'
A.

Types of Amnesia

The most significant form of amnesia for criminal law is psychogenic, or psychic amnesia, of which there are four kinds.8 The first is
localized or circumscribed amnesia. This involves an inability to recall
all the events occurring during a circumscribed period of time, usually
a number of hours, following a profoundly disturbing experience.6 This
type of amnesia is exemplified by the facts of Rex v. Kasperek.' Kasperek was charged with attempted murder for having fired two shots at
his wife with a shotgun following a long period of marital disharmony. 8
The examining psychiatrist reported that the defendant evidenced
symptoms of localized amnesia because he could not recall events for a
three-hour period during which the shooting occurred.9
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The second form of disorder is selective amnesia. This involves an
inability to recall only some of the events which occurred during a certain period of time.'0 This type of amnesia is exemplified by the report
of a man accused of murdering his wife." The defendant shot his wife
in their house, but the bullet wounds were not fatal. Her death was
caused by a blow to her head with a rifle, inflicted by her husband in
the alley behind their house. The defendant had no recollection of hitting his wife over the head with the rifle barrel, but he did recall running out of the house to find help because he had shot his wife. According to the examining psychiatrist, the defendant had not blacked
out but had an altered state of consciousness when he administered the
fatal blow. This altered state was caused by his extreme reaction to the
2
situation and the outpouring of his rage.'
The third kind of amnesia is generalized amnesia, where a person
is unable to recall any of the events of his entire life.' 3 Although generalized amnesia is rare, there are reported cases of it. One such report
involved a man who totally lost any memory of his past life following a
minor traffic accident. He had no memory of his family, his own identity, or the purpose of common objects. Furthermore, he was completely unable to converse due to lack of any memory of language. 4
The fourth kind of amnesia is continuous amnesia. It is characterized by an entire loss of memory from the time of some specific past
event up to and including the present moment.'6 In this very rare type
of amnesia, a person may be alert and aware of what is occurring
around them presently but unable to retain any memory of the most
immediate experience. 16 In one reported case of continuous amnesia, a
person attempted to read a book; after spending an entire day reading
the first page over and over, the person was unable to recall even the
7
title of the book.'
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B.

Diagnostic Criteria

There are two criteria for diagnosing psychogenic amnesia. First,
the person has a sudden inability to recall important personal information that is too extensive to be attributed to forgetfulness. Second, the
person has a non-organic mental disorder involving a blackout without
evidence of an underlying brain disease.'" The onset of amnesia is usually sudden and usually follows psychological stress.'9 Common causes
of such stress include threat of physical injury or death, unacceptability of certain impulses or acts, and a subjectively intolerable
life situation such as abandonment by a spouse.2 0
Psychogenic amnesia is distinguishable from a number of other
conditions associated with impairment of memory. Organic mental disorders can produce impairment of memory, but the onset of memory
loss resulting from such disorders has no relationship to stress. This
type of impairment is greater for more recent experiences and1 is
2
caused by a disturbance of the physiologic functioning of the brain. It
disappears slowly, but full restoration of memory is rare.
Substance-induced intoxication is another condition which can
lead to memory loss. It is characterized by "blackouts" involving a failure to recall events that occurred during the period of intoxication. It
is distinguishable from psychogenic amnesia by both the organic factor
of the substance taken, and the usual failure to obtain full restoration
of memory. 22 One type of substance-induced intoxication is Alcohol
Amnestic Disorder. This is characterized by short-term memory impairment, such that events can be recalled immediately after they occur, but not after the passage of a brief period of time.2 s
Postconcussion amnesia involves memory loss for the time prior to
the event which caused the head trauma. This is in contrast to the
memory loss following a serious incident or disturbing event, character-

18. DMS-III, supra note 2, at 255.
19. Id. at 254.
20. Id.
21. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASsOCIATION, PSYCHIATRIC. GLOSSARY 99 (1984),
which provides the following description of organic mental disorder:
Transient or permanent dysfunction of the brain, caused by a disturbance of
physiologic functioning of brain tissue at any level of organization-Structural,
hormonal, biochemical, electrical, etc. DMS-III recognizes eight organic brain
syndromes: delirium, dementia, amnesic syndrome, organic delusional syndrome, organic personality syndrome, and mixed or atypical brain syndrome,
all of which are classified according to etiology or patho physiology. Causes are
associated with aging, toxic substances, or a variety of physical disorders.
(Emphasis in original.)
22. Id.
23. Id.
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istic of psychogenic amnesia. 2' Loss of consciousness resulting from epilepsy is sudden in onset and usually accompanied by motor abnormalities. 25 A catatonic stupor is characterized by mutism, but there is
26
generally no loss of memory with such a condition.
II.

AMNESIA AND THE CRIMINAL LAW

There are two practical concerns which necessarily arise when discussing the significance of amnesia to a criminal trial. First, there is a
need to determine whether a defendant is truly suffering from amnesia,
or merely malingering or feigning insanity.27 To determine whether
amnesia is being simulated, it has been suggested that careful questioning should be taken under hypnosis or during an amythal interview.2s Second, it must be determined whether a defendant is suffering
from amnesia or merely experiencing simple inattentiveness, or a failure to register memory as a result of an altered state of consciousness. 29 In this determination, it is necessary to examine the circumstances attendant to a person's past experience, as alcoholic or drug
intoxication, epilepsy, head injury, hypoglycemia, or emotional disturbance caused by sexual excitement, conflict, or acute anxiety. 0
When these practical concerns are overcome, and it's determined
that a defendant has truly suffered amnesia, evidence of such amnesia
is relevant to at least five major issues in criminal trials: (1) mens rea,
(2) diminished capacity, (3) the insanity defense, (4) lack of fitness to
stand trial, or (5) sentencing and the death penalty. This article will
discuss the significance of amnesia to each of these issues.
A.

Amnesia and Mens Rea

In many jurisdictions, a defendant may introduce evidence of an
abnormal mental condition to establish that he or she lacked the requi-

24. Id. at 254-255.
25. Id. at 255. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 38
(1984), which describes epilepsy as a convulsive disorder as distinguished from an effective disorder.
26. Id. at 255.
27. See generally, Lennox, Amnesia, Real and Feigned, 10 U. CHI. L. REV. 298, 310
(1943).
28. DMS-Ill, supra note 2, at 255. The use of amythal (amobarbital) is generally
useful in diminishing psychogenic signs while exaggerating organic signs; the test is ad-

ministered by infusing amythal intravenous lymystagmus (a spasmodic, involuntary motion of the eyeball) occurs.
29. See generally O'Connell, The Defense of Amnesia, 26
(1958) (hereinafter referred to as Defense of Amnesia.
30. Id. at 26.

MEDICO-LEGAL

J. 25
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site mental state for the offense charged." Simply stated, the mental
disorder is logically relevant to show the lack of the requisite mens rea.
The jurisdictions which recognize this defense have generally taken one
of four positions. The first approach permits admission of any evidence
of mental disease or defect to negate any culpable state of mind that is
an element of the offense charged.3" A second approach limits the admissibility of evidence of mental disorder to negate the requirement of
"specific intent" where such is an element of the particular offense.33
The third approach restricts the admission of mental disorder to murder cases, to negate the intent to kill or the malice and premeditation
requirements of murder.3 4 The final approach precludes the admission
of evidence of mental disorder, except to establish a defense of
insanity3s
The use of evidence of mental disorder to negate a required state
of mind does not provide a special defense to a criminal charge apart
from a defense which negates the requisite elements of the statutorily
defined offense. Whenever a specific state of mind is required by the

31. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 325-332
(1972) (hereinafter referred to as LAFAVE & Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW.
32. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). "Evidence
that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is
relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind which is an
element of the offense;" Campbell v. State, 265 Ark. 77, 576 W.E.2d 938 (1979) (even
where evidence of mental disorder does not constitute a separate defense, it is relevant
on the issue of culpable state of mind); IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (Supp. 1983) (although
mental condition is not a defense to crime, this does not prevent the admission of expert
evidence of mental illness when relevant to the issue of mens rea or state of mind that is
an element of an offense).
33. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brantner, 486 Pa. 518, 406 A.2d 1011 (1079)
(mental illness is a valid defense to any specific intent crime); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1803 (1978) (statute provides for mental illness negating specific intent).
34. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Goula, 380 Mass. 672, 405 N.E.2d 927 (1980) (allowing evidence of mental illness which if negating premeditation could reduce first degree murder to second degree); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54a(b) (West Supp. 1985)
(evidence of mental illness admissible on the question of whether the defendant acted
with intent to cause death).
35. See, e.g., Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64 (App. D.C. 1976), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 911 (recognizing that evidence of mental disease or defect, in the abstract, is
relevant to the issue of intent; the court nevertheless noted the unique position of the
insanity defense which connotes a presumption that a particular individual lacks the
capacity to possess such a state of mind; and that within the range of individuals who are
not insane, the law does not recognize the readily demonstrable fact that as between
individual criminal defendants the nature and development of their mental capabilities
may vary greatly); Sprague v. Sprague, 52 Wis. 2d 89, 187 N.W. 784 (1971) (sane person
is held accountable for his actions; the insane person is not; personality disturbances that
fall short of insanity are not required areas of court inquiry).
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definition of an offense, evidence of mental disorder establishing the
absence of that state of mind is logically relevant and admissible, unless there is some judicial or statutory limitation on its admissibility.
Thus, the approaches outlined above which restrict evidence of mental
disorder to proving insanity per se, lack of specific intent, or lack of
premeditation or deliberation should properly be viewed as limitations
on the relevance and admissibility of evidence relating to the establishment of an offense. The Commentary to the Model Penal Code identifies the basis for objection to such limitations.3" The drafters of the
Code correctly maintain that there is no justification for a policy disallowing relevant psychiatric evidence pertaining to such states of mind
as deliberation and premeditation. According to the drafters, such evidence should be admissible to the same extent as any evidence relevant
37
to showing a lack of requisite element of an offense.
Amnesia qualifies as a type of mental disorder which would negate
specific intent or the requisite mental state defined as an element of an
offense, if it existed at the time the offense was committed. One can
determine the nature of such an amnesia defense by considering a
prosecution for the crime of theft. The Model Penal Code provides
that:
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for theft that the
actor: (a) was unaware that the property or service was that of
another; or (b) acted under an honest claim of right to the
property or service involved or that he had a right to acquire or
dispose of it as he did; or (c) took property exposed for sale,
intending to purchase and pay for it promptly, or reasonably
3 8
believing that the owner, if present would have consented.
One suffering from amnesia at the time of a taking may not be aware
that the property or service was that of another's, or he may believe
that he has a right to the property taken, or he might have no memory
of his intent to purchase and pay for it. In any instance, such a person
would have an affirmative defense to the charge of theft by the terms
of the Model Penal Code's theft statute.
Similarly, one can observe the operation of an amnesia defense in
the case of a charge of perjury. The Model Penal Code provides that:
A person is guilty of perjury, a felony of the third degree, if in
any official proceeding he makes a false statement under oath

36.

See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.02 216-20 (1985).
Id. at 219.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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or equivalent affirmation, or swears or affirms the truth of a
statement previously made, when the statement is material
and he does not believe it to be true.3 9
One suffering from amnesia who lacks memory of facts contrary to the
statement to which he or she affirms, or who mistakenly believes the
statement is true because he or she lacks memory of the true state of
affairs, lacks the required element of affirming a statement he or she
believes to be true.
For amnesia to be used as a defense, it is necessary to prove that
the condition existed either at the time of the crime or for some time
prior, depending on the nature of the false or mistaken belief which
provides the basis for denying the relevant intent or state of mind. The
theory underlying an amnesia defense to negate a specified mental
state, as in the case of perjury, or to establish an affirmative defense, as
in the case of theft, is one of mistake. The Model Penal Code provides
a succinct formulation of the operation of mistake as a defense to a
criminal charge.
Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense
if: (a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a
material element of the offense; or (b) the law provides that
the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake
constitutes a defense."'
The first provision provides the basis for the use of evidence of amnesia to negate the requisite knowledge and intent, as in the case of perjury. The second provision provides the basis for the use of amnesia to
establish an affirmative defense, as in the case of theft.
The grounding of a defense on mistake is also firmly rooted in Anglo-American law. One jurist has observed:
Whenever a legal standard of liability includes some exercise or
expression of the will, some subsidiary rules must be adopted
with respect to mistake. States of volition are necessarily dependent upon states of fact, and a mistaken belief in the existence of circumstances cannot be separated from the manifestation of the will which it prompts. Whether consent,
intention, or motive; is the element which a legal criterion of
liability includes, it is undeniable that a misapprehension of
fact may produce a state of mind which though apparently of

39.
40.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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the required description is yet really of an entirely different
quality."'
The theoretical formulation of mistake is simple. A mistake of fact is a
defense when it negates the existence of a mental state essential to the
crime charged.
Thus, there are three basic approaches for using amnesia as a defense to a criminal charge. First, where a person is shown to have suffered from amnesia at the time of an offense and to lack the requisite
mental state, the prosecution is precluded from meeting the burden of
proof for a conviction. Second, where a person can establish, by proof
of his or her mental state, a lack of awareness or honest belief about
some condition, the person may establish an affirmative defense, if it
has been granted by law. Third, one can ground an amnesia defense on
mistake of fact, where the amnesia produced a false belief, negating a
mental state essential to the crime charged. From any of these three
viewpoints, psychogenic amnesia provides a defense to the required
mental state element of a crime, as statutorily defined.
B.

Amnesia and Diminished Capacity

Diminished capacity is a legal principle which provides for mitigation of punishment in cases where the accused is mentally abnormal in
some way, though not insane. 42 Diminished capacity is best understood
by contrasting it to a defense based on mental disorder negating the
requisite mental state, and to the insanity defense.
Courts have sometimes incorrectly used the term diminished capacity to refer to a defense based on mental disorder negating the requisite mental state.48 However, that defense rests on the basic proposition that all evidence, including that of mental condition, that tends to
confirm or negate a material element of a crime, is logically relevant
and should be considered by a jury.44 Since the prosecution is required
to prove all the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt,45 the
defendant should be given the opportunity to present a defense to each

41. Thomas v. Rex, 59 L.R. 279, 299 (1937) (Dixon, J.).
42. See Sparks, Diminished Responsibility in Theory and Practice, 27 MoD. L.
REV. 9 (1966).
43. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946). See generally D. HERMANN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: PHILOSOPHICAL, HISTORICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 12123 (1983).
44. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, § 4.02, at
219 (1985).
45. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977) (a state must prove every
ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt).
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element. Diminished capacity should be viewed as an affirmative defense founded on excuse, which involves the assertion of reduced culpability because of an impaired mental capacity.
Both diminished capacity and the absence of a requisite mental
state are distinguishable from the insanity defense. Insanity provides a
complete defense to a criminal charge where a defendant's mental disability precludes the culpability required for criminal punishment." Regardless of how the insanity test is formulated, the theoretical basis is
that it is improper to punish a person who is incapable of conforming
to the requirements of law, and, therefore, is not blameworthy. The
insanity defense can also be distinguished from a defense of mental
disorder negativing a requisite mental state. As Justice Rehnquist has
observed: "The existence or nonexistence of legal insanity bears no relationship to the existence or nonexistence of the required mental elements of the crime. ' Lack of requisite mental state means that an
element of the crime charged cannot be proved. The insanity defense,
in contrast, is a defense based on excuse. An insane person lacks the
capacity to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the
law." Diminished capacity is also based on an excuse related to mental
disorder; however, insanity totally precludes culpability, while diminished capacity merely reduces the degree of culpability.
The diminished capacity defense recognizes a defendant's psychological abnormality as a mitigating factor of criminal liability." A number of European legal systems adopt such an approach. Instead of relating a psychological abnormality to an element of an offense as a
means of reducing criminal responsibility, the court or jury is provided
with the authority to reduce the penalty for an offense because of
mental disorder.5 0 The Italian Penal Code, for example, provides that:
"Anyone who, at the time he committed the act, was by reason of infirmity, in such state of mind as to greatly diminish, without precluding
his capacity to understand and to will, shall be liable for the offense

46. E.g., People v. Gillings, 39 Colo. App. 387, 568 P.2d 92 (1977) (insanity at the
time of the alleged offense is a complete defense to a criminal charge).
47. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 706 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
48. See e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES,
§ 4.01 164 (1985). "To be held irresponsible, the individual must, as a result of a mental
disease or defect, either lack substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or lack substantial capacity to conform his conduct to legal
requirements."
49. See generally J. C. SMITH & B. HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 176-181 (4th ed. 1978).
50. See generally Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-53, Report App.
9, at 414-16 (1953).
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committed; but the punishment shall be reduced."'" The effect of the
Italian code provision is to permit conviction of the crime charged, but
to allow for a lessened punishment because of a lower level of
culpability.
Another example is Scottish law, where diminished capacity has
been a defense for over a hundred years. It was originally expressed as
"lessened responsibility" and "inferior responsibility."5 2 For over fifty
years, Scottish courts have used the term "diminished responsibility"
to refer to a person who merits a lesser punishment because of mental
53
disorder.
Of particular significance is the English doctrine of "diminished
responsibility" introduced into English law by section two of the
Homicide Act of 1957. It provides, in part:
Where a person kills or is a party to a killing of another, he
shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such
abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes
induced by disease or injury) or substantially impaired his
mental responsibility for his acts and missions in doing or being a party to a killing .... A person who but for this section
would be liable . . . to be convicted of murder shall be liable
54
instead to be convicted of manslaughter.
Thus, under the English Homicide Act, a mental disorder such as amnesia, which affects the defendant at the time of the offense, not only
reduces the punishment, as under the Italian Penal Code, but also affects the grade of the offense. A defendant may avoid conviction for
murder by reducing a homicide to manslaughter if it is established that
at the time of the crime the defendant was suffering from an "abnormality of the mind" which "substantially impaired his mental respon55
sibility" in regard to the killing.
To satisfy the requirements of diminished responsibility, amnesia
must qualify as an "abnormality of mind" and must affect the defend'
ant's "mental responsibility for his acts."56
English courts have provided some guidance in determining whether amnesia meets these re-

51.

23 E.

WISE, THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: ITALIAN PENAL

CODE Title IV, Art. 89, at 32-33 (1978).

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Diguall (1867) 5 Irv. 466; McLean (1876) 3 Coup. 334.
Savage (1923) J.C. 49; Muir (1933) J.C. 46.
English Homicide Act 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 11, § 2.
Id.
Id.
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quirements. The Court of Criminal Appeal in Regina v. Byrne57 held
"abnormality of mind" to mean "a state of mind so different from that
of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man [defined as "a man
'
with a normal mind"] would term it abnormal."58
This concept was
held to be
• . . wide enough to cover the mind's activities in all its aspects, not only the perception of physical acts and matters, and
the ability to form a rational judgment whether an act is right
or wrong, but also the ability to exercise will-power to control
physical acts in accordance with that rational judgment."9
The court in Byrne went on to state that "mental responsibility for his
acts" involved "a consideration of the extent to which the accused's
mind is answerable for his physical acts, which must include a consideration of the extent of his ability to exercise will-power to control his
physical acts."' 0
A defendant suffering from amnesia at the time of a criminal act
may show that the condition affected "perception," as well as the
"ability to form a rational judgment" about the criminality or wrongfulness of the action. If so, he or she will not be answerable for the
physical acts. In this way, the defendant establishes lack of "mental
responsibility" for the conduct. When a defendant characterizes an
amnesic condition as an abnormality of mind, and proves that it affected the mental responsibility for his or her acts, the defendant has
proven diminished responsibility under English law.
No American jurisdiction has adopted a diminished capacity defense comparable to Europe's. However, California developed a variant
of diminished responsibility which went beyond the use of mental disorder to negate mens rea.6 1 The California approach permitted a defendant to establish that mental abnormality prevented him or her
from entertaining a required mental state. However, the California approach not only permitted a defendant to produce evidence that his or
her mental capacity prevented him from entertaining a requisite
mental state, but also to show that he lacked the capacity to appreciate
the full moral significance of his action by showing that such capacity
was diminished as a result of mental disorder. The consequence of such

57. Regina v. Byrne (1960), 44 Crim. App. (Eng.) 256.
58. Id. at 252.
59. Id. See also Rose v. Regina (1961), 45 Crim. App. (Eng.) 102; Regina v. Terry
(1961), 45 Crim. App. (Eng.) 180.
60. 44 Crim. App. (Eng.) at 253.
61. See text accompanying notes 62 through 92.
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a showing was that the defendant could not be held fully responsible
for the criminal conduct.
Initially, the California courts adopted a simple mens rea logical
relevance approach. In People v.Wells 62 a defendant charged with assaulting a prison guard "with malice aforethought, 3 offered evidence
that at the time of the assault he was in a "state of tension." He had
an abnormal fear for his personal safety and mistakenly believed he
was defending himself when he assaulted the guard.64 The defendant
argued that this precluded "malice aforethought." The California Supreme Court held that competent evidence of a defendant's mental abnormality was admissible to prove lack of the required specific intent. 5
It also held that psychiatric evidence was admissible to negate proof of
malice, since malice was an element of specific intent.6
Like a state of tension, amnesia may lead to a mistaken belief precluding some state of mind. Thus, proof of amnesia which precludes a
required intentional state of mind would provide a defense to a criminal charge.
A modified diminished responsibility defense was adopted by the
California Supreme Court in People v. Wolff. 7 Wolff admitted that he
had killed his mother so he could bring girls home to rape them. He
struck his mother from behind with an axe, then choked her as she
crawled to another room.6 9 Expert witnesses testified that Wolff was
schizophrenic and legally insane at the time of the killing.70 However,
the jury rejected the defendant's insanity defense. On appeal, the California Supreme Court refused to overturn the jury's finding. The court
found substantial evidence of legal sanity from defendant's objective
conduct and declarations, including his ability to devise and execute an
elaborate plan, his consciousness of what he was doing, and his orientation as to time, place, and those who were present.7 ' The court reaffirmed its adherence to the M'Naghten test for insanity, requiring that:
[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act,
the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason,

62.
63.
64.
65.

People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 4500 (West 1970).
Wells, 33 Cal. 2d at 334-45, 202 P.2d at 62.
Id. at 351, 202 P.2d at 66.

66.

Id.

67.
68.
69.
70.

People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
Id. at 806-7, 394 P.2d at 965, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 277.
Id.
Id. at 803-04, 394 P.2d at 964, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 276.

71.

Id.
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from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he as doing, or if he did know it, that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong. 2
The court observed that the experts' conclusions that the defendant
was insane were based on volitional criteria that the M'Naghten test
did not recognize as a proper basis for inferring insanity. 7s
The court also found facts that precluded a strict use of the test
negating mens rea. The court observed that "there is no question that
the defendant had the intent to kill."'74 The facts clearly indicated that
days before the homicide, Wolff formed a specific intent to kill, devised
a plan, and had ample opportunity to reflect on what he was going to
do. The expert testimony did not raise any question about whether
Wolff possessed the minimal capacity needed to premeditate and deliberate. Nor did the testimony raise any doubt as to whether Wolff
did in fact premeditate and deliberate before the killing. Thus, the
court was precluded from using the mental-state analysis of Wells, 75
which limited use of evidence of mental disorder to show that a defendant did not entertain the requisite mental state.
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court reversed Wolff's first
degree murder conviction. The court held that the defendant, by virtue
of his youth and psychological abnormality, was not capable of the
mental processes required to commit first degree murder. The evidence
showed that the defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the killing and that he was not a fully mature, nor mentally well, person. The
court observed that "the mental infirmity of this defendant presents a
very serious factual problem as to the quantum of his personal turpitude and depravity as inherently related to the degree of murder. ' 76
The court focused on the deliberation and premeditation language of
the first degree murder statute. 77 This language had previously been
construed to require a substantial degree of thought, and deliberate
judgment or planning. 78 However, the Wolff court more broadly interpreted the deliberation and premeditation elements to require something more. The court held that to convict a defendant of first degree
murder, "the true test must include consideration of the somewhat

72. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Ez. Reg. 718, 722 (1843).
73. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d at 814-15, 394 P.2d at 971, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
74. Id. at 820, 394 P.2d at 975, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
75. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53.
76. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d at 820, 394 P.2d at 975, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
77. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1979).
78. People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d 880, 156 P.2d 7 (1945). See also People v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 2d 15, 447 P.2d 942, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1968).
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limited extent to which the defendant could maturely and meaning7' 9
fully reflect upon the gravity of his contemplated act.
Applying this criteria to the case at hand, the court reasoned:
Certainly in the case now at bench the defendant had ample
time for any normal person to maturely and appreciatively reflect upon his contemplated act and to arrive at a cold deliberated and premeditated conclusion. He did this in a sense and
apparently to the full extent of which he was capable. But, indisputable on the record, this defendant was not and is not a
fully normal or a mature, mentally well person. He knew the
difference between right and wrong, he knew that the intended
act was wrong and nevertheless carried it out. But the extent
of his understanding, reflection upon it and its consequences,
with realization of the enormity of the evil, appears to have
been materially-as relevant to appraising the quantum of his
moral depravity-vague and detached. 0
The court reduced the judgment from first degree murder to second degree murder. It justified the reduction on the same ground
which underlies the English Homicide Act, by providing for a reduction in the criminal charge and the degree of punishment where diminished capacity was established. The California court reasoned that
Wolff's mental illness had robbed him of the capacity to evaluate the
seriousness of his contemplated action, and that he could not be held
morally responsible for his acts.
In People v. Conley,81 the California Supreme Court dealt with another impaired defendant whose conduct satisfied all the formal elements of first degree murder. Conley had killed his lover and her husband. He had been drinking for several days before the murders and
provided a defense based on alcohol amnesia. The defendant testified
that he did not remember having committed the homicides and
presented evidence that the amount of alcohol he had consumed would
impair the judgment of an average person. Additionally, there was expert psychiatric testimony that the defendant "was in a dissociative
state at the time of the killings and because of personality fragmenta82
tion did not function with his normal personality.

79.
original).
80.
81.
82.

Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d at 821, 394 P.2d at 975, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 287 (emphasis in
Id. at 821-22, 394 P.2d at 975-76, 40 Cal. Rptr. 287-288.
People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Reptr. 815 (1966).
Id. at 315, 411 P.2d at 914, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
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The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction of first degree murder on the ground that the trial court had erroneously refused
to give manslaughter instructions based on diminished capacity. The
court held that the statutory definition of malice implies "an awareness
of the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society. '8 3 The court reasoned: "If because of mental defect, disease or intoxication.., the defendant is unable to comprehend his duty to govern his action in accord with the duty imposed by law, he does not act
with malice aforethought .. .," The Conley test provides a type of
impaired capacity, or diminished responsibility, test based on one form
of amnesia. The test provides that even where the effect of mental disorder on a defendant does not provide a basis for the insanity defense;
nevertheless, where the defendant's ability to know and understand
the difference between right and wrong is sufficiently diminished by
mental abnormality characterized by amnesia, it warrants a reduction
in both the grade of the offense and the sentence imposed.
This test captures the main features of the English form of diminished capacity. It reduces the grade of offense, and consequently the
degree of punishment, on the ground that mental disorder has affected
the defendant's capacity to comprehend the legal prohibition against
endangering the life of another, and the obligation to conform to this
standard. 85
This form of diminished responsibility can easily accommodate a
defense based on amnesia. The Conley8" opinion explained the effect of
its diminished responsibility doctrine by reference to an earlier case,
People v. Gorshen.87 Gorshen had testified that he had forgotten
"about God's laws and human's laws and everything else." 8 The court
assessed the significance of this mental condition:
Confronted with this evidence, the court or a jury could conclude that the defendant killed intentionally, with premeditation, but did not do so with malice aforethought. Although legally sane according to the M'Naghten test, such a defendant
could not be convicted of murder if mental illness prevented
his acting with malice aforethought.8 9

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 323, 411 P.2d at 919, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 823.

Id.
Id. at 324 n.4, 411 P.2d 920 n.4, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 824 n.4.
Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815.
People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d. 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1956).
Id. at 723, 336 P.2d at 496.
Conley, 64 Cal. 2d at 322, 411 P.2d at 918.
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Similarly, a showing of amnesia, with the effect that the defendant forgot "about God's laws and human's laws and everything else", would
preclude malice aforethought and thus prevent a conviction of murder.
In 1981, the California legislature abolished the judicial formulation of diminished capacity which followed the English model.90 In its
place, the legislature substituted the form of diminished capacity
which is part of the Italian Penal Code, permitting evidence of diminished capacity to reduce the degree of punishment. This statutory language provides:
The defense of diminished capacity is hereby abolished. In a
criminal action, as well as any juvenile court proceeding, evidence concerning an accused person's intoxication, trauma,
mental illness, disease or defect shall not be admissible to show
or negate capacity to form the particular purpose, intent, motive, malice, aforethought, knowledge, or other mental state required for commission of the crime charged. Notwithstanding
the foregoing evidence of diminished capacity or of a mental
disorder may be considered by the court only at time of sentencing or other disposition or commitment.9 1
The California statute thus precludes the admission of evidence to
show lack of capacity to hold a requisite mental state. Instead, the
statute permits admission of such evidence to show that a defendant
did not actually hold the requisite mental state. It thus substitutes a
mens rea defense in place of the diminished capacity defense. The statute further provides:
Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder
shall not be admitted to show or negate the capacity to form
any mental state, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent,
knowledge, premeditation, deliberation, or malice aforethought, with which the accused committed the act. Evidence
of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the accused actually
formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated,
or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime
is charged, [and that] [a]s a matter of public policy, there shall
be no defense of diminished capacity, diminished responsibility, or irresistible impulse in a criminal action or juvenile adjudication hearing.2

90.

91.
92.

25(a), (c) (West 1985).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(a), (c) (West 1985) (emphasis added).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(a), (b) (West 1985) (emphasis added).
CAL. PENAL CODE §
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The effect of these two statutory provisions is to permit the use of
amnesia to negate specific intent when it is an element of the offense,
but to preclude the use of such evidence for any other mental state.
Evidence of amnesia to show diminished capacity in order to establish
a lesser degree of culpability is not admissible at trial. However, it can
be considered at the time of sentencing. This approach is like that
adopted in the Italian Penal Code, which provides for liability for the
offense committed but allows for a reduction in punishment because of
mental infirmity.
The California experience reveals what is at the heart of the diminished responsibility doctrine. A full diminished responsibility defense gives the jury de facto sentencing power to mitigate the punishment of a mentally disabled offender, when the offender's capacity for
culpable behavior was reduced at the time of the offense as a result of
a mental disorder, such as amnesia. Without the diminished responsibility defense, a defendant would be restricted to a mens rea or insanity defense on the issue of guilt, but may otherwise submit evidence
of mental disorder for consideration in sentencing.
C.

Amnesia and the Insanity Defense

The broadest formulation of the insanity defense provides that a
person is excused for his conduct constituting a criminal offense, if as a
result of (1) a mental disease or defect, (2) the person (i) does not perceive the physical nature or consequences of the conduct, or (ii) does
not know the conduct is wrong or criminal, or (iii) is not sufficiently
able to control the conduct.9 3 To establish an insanity defense on the
basis of amnesia, a defendant must first show that the amnesia is a
mental disease or defect, or that it was suffered as a result of a mental
disease or defect. Second, the defendant must show that the amnesia
resulted in an inability to perceive the physical nature or consequences
of the action, or that it prevented him or her from knowing the action
was wrong. Since amnesia does not impair one's ability to control one's
conduct, it seems unlikely that one could establish an insanity defense
based on amnesia by showing impairment of ability to conform to the
requirements of law.
There is not a well-developed body of law identifying what is included within the concepts of "mental disease" or "mental defect."

93.

P.

ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES,

284 (1984). See generally, D. HERMANN,
(1983).

THE INSANITY DEFENSE: PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
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Some have maintained that only a psychosis should be included.9 4
Others have suggested that any "abnormal condition" having a substantial effect on emotional processes should be included.9 5 It is clear
that psychiatric disorders seriously affecting the ability of a person to
perceive reality qualify as a mental disease, even under the restrictive
M'Naghten test for insanity.96 A formulation, useful for assessing the
significance of amnesia for establishment of the insanity defense, has
been provided by one standard commentary: "'mental disease or defect' which may be shortened to 'mental disorder' in general discussion
if this is clearly understood to include disease of the mind, congenital
lack, and damage resulting from traumatic injury, but to exclude excitement or stupefaction resulting from liquor or drugs. '97 A psychotic
disorder which has amnesia as one of its effects qualifies as a mental
disease. 8 Temporary emotional strain due to anger, panic, grief, or
stress, however, do not qualify.9 9 Therefore, amnesia resulting from
such conditions does not provide a basis for an insanity defense. 00

94. See, e.g., People v. Kuhn, 68 Ill.
App. 3d 59, 385 N.E.2d 388 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)
(abnormality diagnosed as psychosis satisfies mental disease requirement). See generally, A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 23 (1967).
95. See, e.g., Territory v. Alscosiba, 36 Hawaii 231, 238 (1942) (mental disease is
any underdevelopment, pathological condition, lesion or malfunctioning of the brain or
any morbid change or deterioration in the organic functions or structure of the brain).
See generally, W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 31, at 275.
96.
97.

See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 31, at 275.
R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 952 (3d ed. 1982).
98. United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406, 409-10 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that
the insanity defense was raised by evidence of psychomotor epilepsy, developed traumatically during World War II from a gun blast in the face, from malaria, both which caused
the defendant to suffer frequent seizures especially at times of stress, manifested by tearing, salivation, and jerking or jabbing movements of the right hand leading to acts of
violence of which the defendant would have no subsequent memory).
99. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Commentary) 7-6.1, at 335 (2d ed.
1980), where a standard view of "mental disease or defect" is set out:
Although the impairment of mind .. .is thus not to be equated with any particular diagnostic category, it must be attributable to a substantial process of
functional or organic impairment. Mere defects of character or strong passion,
if legally relevant in any sense, should be considered only at sentencing. Were
it otherwise, the defense would have no threshold at all; every abnormal defendant-and every normal defendant who became abnormally impassioned-could be said to have a 'mental disease.'
100. See United States v. Olvera, C.M.A. 134, 141, 15 C.M.R. 134, 141 (1954) (amnesia to be of significance must be linked to other evidence suggesting, in some measure
at least, the existence of a mental state which would serve to negate criminal
responsibility).
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Similarly, amnesia or blackouts resulting from alcohol or drug use do
not qualify as mental diseases. 10 '
A mental disease or defect accompanied by amnesia has exculpatory significance only if it results in a defect in perception so that a
defendant does not perceive the physical nature or consequences of an
action or does not know that the conduct is wrong or criminal. 102 If the
primary characteristic of the defendant's mental disorder is amnesia it
must result in some cognitive disfunction which deprives a defendant
of reason so that 10he
is incapable of understanding and acting in con3
formity with law.
Very few appellate opinions from English speaking countries have
considered insanity defenses based on amnesia. However, opinions of
the United States Military Court of Appeals provide a comprehensive
consideration of amnesia as an insanity defense,' 0 ' and those civil
courts which have commented on the issue are in accord with the military courts.'0 5
In United States v. Olvera,0 a the military court considered the
significance of evidence of unconsciousness or mental blackout for general criminal responsibility. The defendant was charged with assault
with a dangerous weapon. The evidence showed that the defendant
had consumed substantial quantities of alcohol but had very few symptoms of drunkenness. 07 The defendant testified that he had been
struck one or more times on the head and had temporarily lost all recollection. He further testified that when his memory returned, he was
standing over the bleeding victim with a knife in his hand.'0 8

101. See Kane v. United States, 399 F.2d 730, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1968) (there is no
present judicial recognition of an affirmative defense based on "pathological intoxication" accompanied with blackouts).
102. See Thomas v. State, 201 Tenn. 645, 301 S.W.2d 358, 361 (1957) (amnesia, in
and of itself, is no defense to a criminal charge unless it is shown by competent evidence
that the accused "did not know the nature and quality of his action and that it was
wrong.").
103. See People v. Freeman, 61 Cal. App. 2d 110, 142 P.2d 438 (Cal Ct. App. 1943).
104. See United States v. Olvera, 4 C.M.A. 134, 15 C.M.R. 134 (1954); United
States v. Marriott, 4 C.M.A. 390, 15 C.M.R. 390 (1954); United States v. Lopez-Malove,
15 C.M.R. 341, 4 C.M.A. 341 (1954); United States v. Higgins, 4 C.M.A. 143, 15 C.M.R.
143 (1954); United Stated v. Johnson, 4 C.M.A. 149, 15 C.M.R. 149 (1954); United States
v. Bourchier, 5 C.M.A. 15, 17 C.M.R. 15 (1954); United States v. Burke, 5 C.M.A. 56, 17
C.M.R. 56 (1954); United States v. O'Connell, 18 C.M.R. 881 (1955); United States v.
Blankenship, 20 C.M.R. 881 (1955).
105. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 201 Tenn. 645, 301 S.W.2d 358, 361 (1957); Askew
v. State, 118 So.2d 219, 222 (Fla. 1960).
106. United States v. Olvera, 4 C.M.A. 134, 15 C.M.R. 134 (1954).
107. 4 C.M.A. at 136, 15 C.M.R. at 136.
108. Id.

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

The defense argued that evidence of amnesia established the defense of insanity.' 0 9 The court stated the defense's position as follows:
[I]f an accused is genuinely unable to recall transactions which
took place during a certain period of time, he must necessarily
have been unable during the same period either to form a
criminal intent, or to distinguish right from wrong ....[I]f one

is totally unable to remember events, it is impossible, or at
least highly improbable, that a condition of legal sanity could
have existed during the 'blackout' interval. " °
The military court rejected this reasoning and stated that: "Amnesia
is-in and of itself-a relatively neutral circumstance in its bearing on
criminal responsibility.""' The court based its conclusion on medical
science, as well as an analysis of the doctrinal elements of the insanity defense.
The court noted that loss of memory often results from head injuries and other sources and could be temporary or permanent." 2 The
court acknowledged the layman's view that one should not be held
criminally accountable for acts committed in such a state. However, as
a legal matter the court maintained that not every instance of amnesia
negates mental and legal responsibility for episodes lying outside recollection." 3 The court suggested that it would be improper, for example,
to excuse a defendant of rape, where his total amnesia was the result of
alcohol consumption, he fled when his victim screamed, and he thereafter eluded authorities. Such conduct would be evidence that the defendant was aware of having done something wrong. 1 4 On the other
hand, the court suggested an instance where it would be proper to excuse an amnesic defendant. It considered the situation where a person
roamed noisily through an army barracks rifling clothing on a clothes
rack and removing items from pockets, while in a somnambulistic state
as a result of an epileptic seizure. If the person had no consciousness of
what he was doing at the time of the offense, had suffered from somnambulism since childhood, and had registered as having psychomotor
epilepsy on an electroencephalograph, it would be proper to find a lack
of mental responsibility. This conclusion, however, would be based on

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 137, 15 C.M.R. at 137.
Id.
Id. at 141, 15 C.M.R. at 151.
Id. at 137, 15 C.M.R. at 137.
Id.
Id.
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the finding of psychomotor epilepsy with resultant amnesia and not on
a finding of amnesia standing alone." 5
The military court identified the general rule regarding the significance of amnesia for establishing a defense of insanity: "[A]mnesia [is]
significant only as a symptom confirming other evidence to the effect
that the accused did not know the nature and quality of his acts during
the period for which he lacked recall."' " The court then went on to
assess the significance of the principal sources of amnesia according to
medical science. These sources include: hysteria,7 psychosis, alcoholism,
head injury, epileptic fugue, and malingering."1
Malingering has no effect on criminal accountability since one cannot be exculpated by conscious falsehoods concerning loss of memory. '18 However, since an epileptic fugue results in automatism during
a seizure, the court reasoned that it does provide a basis for finding an
absence of criminal liability.'" Psychosis accompanied by amnesia was
said to be symptomatic of a break with reality which might deprive a
person of the ability to distinguish between right and wrong. An accused who recognized that he or she was engaged in the performance of
20
a criminal act, however, would be held legally responsible.1
Amnesia resulting from a head injury would have no exculpating
effect if the injury produced a retrograde amnesia.' 2' If the head injury
occurred before the criminal acts, on the other hand, there would be a
basis for exculpation, provided two requirements are met. First, the
amnesia must be attributable to injuries received without fault on the
part of the accused. Second, the injury and consequent amnesia must
deprive the accused of the ability to understand the nature of the conduct or to distinguish right from wrong. If these requirements were satisfied, the court indicated that amnesia would have an exculpating
effect. "22
'
Amnesia due to alcoholism constitutes a mens rea type of defense,
provided the resulting mental condition prevented the accused from
entertaining a specific intent to premeditate. 2 ' However, amnesia or
blackouts following voluntary intoxication would not support an insanity defense unless the alcoholism resulted in brain damage amount-
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Id. at 138, 15 C.M.R. at 138.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 138-9, 15 C.M.R. at 138-9.
Id. at 139, 15 C.M.R. at 139.
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ing to a mental defect, disease, or significant mental derangement.'2 4
On this subject, the military court concluded:
Literally nothing has been brought to our attention which indicates that one who 'blacks out' when drunk is . . . suffering
from a mental defect, disease or derangement ... [w]e are certain indeed that we would be adding unwarranted gloss to the
[law] were we to hold that drunkenness is an excuse for crime,
provided only that the accused was sufficiently intoxicated to
5
blot from his mind all memory of the facts of the offense.1
Finally, the military court turned to amnesia arising from hysteria.
The court first noted that medical authorities had "pointed out that
not infrequently amnesia is precipitated by the very commission of
crime-and thus is to be regarded as in no sense symptomatic of a
deranged mental state destructive of criminal responsibility.' ' 26 The
court observed that, following the commission of a heinous act such as
rape, murder, or aggravated assault, it is common for a person to experience a genuine blackout and loss of conscious memory of perpetrating
the act.'27 The court, however, acknowledged the possibility of hysteria
as a lifetime disorder, which could provide a basis for a clinical judgment of mental disease or defect.12 8 The court then formulated the legal rule governing hysterical amnesia: "In the absence of a history of
hysteria or related disturbed states, hysterical amnesia does not reduce
criminal responsibility since the individual affected is able to distinguish right from wrong and to adhere to the right at the time of
29
his offense.'
The military court applied this general legal analysis to the evidence in the case before it. The court found inconclusive evidence that
the defendant suffered a severe blow which might have produced amnesia. Further, there was no evidence of a history of mental disease,
nor evidence that the defendant suffered from epilepsy or had a history of blackouts. The court concluded that "the accused singly failed
to link his amnesia to any type of automatism, or to demonstrate that
[assault] was related in any way to a 'mental defect, disease or derangement' depriving him of legal responsibility."' 30 As a matter of law
the court concluded that to be of legal significance for the insanity de-
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fense, amnesia must be linked to other evidence indicating mental disease or defect which would serve to negate criminal responsibility, and
that "[a]mnesia is-in and of itself-a relatively neutral circumstance
in its bearing on criminal responsibility." 13 1
The Court of Military Appeals considered the significance of amnesia both as a basis for the insanity defense and as negating the required mens rea of an offense in United States v. Higgins.1 32 Higgins
was charged with disrespect toward a superior officer, willful disobedience, and assault and battery. The defense submitted the following evidence bearing on the defendant's mental responsibility: (1) the defendant had consumed a substantial quantity of alcohol shortly before the
incident; (2) he had suffered a skull fracture in childhood; (3) he had
suffered another head injury several years before the incident; (4) he
had a history of blackouts; and (5) he had no memory of the conduct
with which he was charged.' The court observed that the effects of
drunkenness may obliterate all knowledge of the nature of what one is
doing, and preclude an element essential for guilt of a particular offense. 13 4 The court found that the defendant had not established that
he was intoxicated to the extent that he lacked knowledge of what he
was doing.
Turning to the legal significance of amnesia, the court ruled:
[Aimnesia, plus other evidence of mental shortcomings, may
require an instruction not only on insanity, but also on the possibility of partial criminal responsibility ... we would consider

that the existence of mental processes, such as intent or premeditation, necessary for conviction of certain crimes, may be
negated by a showing that the accused's mind could not entertain these processes.' 33
The court observed that "a mere claim of memory loss without more
must be regarded as inconclusive

. .

. [but that] ... in the instant case

the amnesia was related to a claim of former skull fracture as well as to
temporary, but doubtless acute, alcoholism.""' While the evidence of
amnesia bore on the issue of general mental responsibility and required
an instruction on insanity, the court found it did not preclude a verdict
3
of guilt.
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United States v. Higgins, 4 C.M.A. 143, 15 C.M.R. 143 (1954).
Id. at 146, 15 C.M.R. at 146.
Id. at 147, 15 C.M.R. at 147.
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The legal significance of continuous hysteric amnesia was considered by the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. LopezMalave.' 38 The defendant was charged with failure to obey a lawful
order, leaving his post without being relieved, and assault with a dangerous weapon. Stipulation testimony of the examining psychiatrist revealed that the defendant suffered from amnesia. "The amnesia which
this soldier manifests is a true amnesia and is due to hysteria which
developed after the time of the alleged offenses and which therefore
does not indicate inability to distinguish right from wrong as to adhere
to the right with respect to the acts charged." 13 9 The expert further
diagnosed the defendant's amnesia as continuous. "The amnesia extends not only to the period of time in which the incident alleged in
the charges and specifications occurred, but also to almost anything
that had occurred in the past."' 40 Nevertheless, the psychiatrist determined that the defendant was not insane at the time of the offense and
was competent to stand trial. The psychiatrist reasoned that the defendant understood the nature of the proceedings and was able to cooperate with his counsel except for the effect of his amnesia as to
events occurring in his past."" The expert concluded that the defendant suffered from an "amnesia [which] is an isolated symptom and is
not due to general psychiatric disease."' 4 "
The military court endorsed the expert's formulation for determining whether amnesia could provide a basis for an insanity defense.
Two questions must be addressed in making such a determination. The
defense is available unless the accused was at the time of the alleged
offense so far free from mental disease, defects, or derangement as to
be able to (1) distinguish right from wrong;' 43 and (2) adhere to the
right concerning the particular acts charged.' 4
'
In United States v. Marriott,4
the Court of Military Appeals specifically considered whether the law recognized a defense of alcoholic
amnesia. The defendant plead a defense of alcoholic amnesia to a
charge of theft of a fellow soldier's wallet. The defendant testified that
he had been drinking during the evening of the theft and that he had
no recollection of having taken the wallet. He postulated that he might
have taken it unknowingly, because on three previous occasions he had
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blacked out, acted in an unbecoming manner, and was unable to re46
member any incident involved in his misbehavior.1
The court ruled that alcoholic amnesia was not "a mental defect,
disease, or derangement which will excuse the commission of a
crime.'

14 7

After examining military and civilian law, the court set out

the rule governing alcoholic amnesia as a basis for an insanity defense.
The court concluded that the evidence in the case was not sufficient to
raise a question of insanity.'48
The Court of Military Appeals' analysis of the significance of amnesia for an insanity defense can be summarized as follows: In order to
establish an insanity defense based on amnesia, the amnesia must be
linked to other evidence of mental disorder or mental defect. Amnesia
resulting from intoxication does not establish legal insanity. In sum,
"amnesia in and of itself is a relatively neutral circumstance in its
149
bearing on criminal responsibility.

Civilian courts adhere to the same analysis of the significance of
amnesia for an insanity defense as that developed by the military
courts. The Supreme Court of Tennessee, for example, has held that:
"[A]mnesia, in and of itself is no defense to a criminal charge unless it
is shown by competent evidence that the accused did not know the
nature and quality of his action and that it was wrong. '150 The Supreme Court of Florida, in accordance with the reasoning of the military courts, has held that amnesia resulting from voluntary intoxica5
tion is only a defense if it produces a mental condition of insanity.' '
D.

Amnesia and Fitness to Stand Trial

At common law, a person who was unable to make a rational de-

52
fense as a result of a mental disorder could not be tried for a crime.,

Criminal proceedings were suspended until the defendant regained
mental competency. The justification for this rule has long received judicial recognition:

146.
147.
148.
149.
States v.

Id. at 392, 15 C.M.R. at 392.
Id. at 393, 15 C.M.R. at 393.
Id. at 395-96, 15 C.M.R. at 395-96.
United States v. Blankenship, 20 C.M.R. 881, 886 (1955). See also United
O'Connell, 18 C.M.R. 881, 887-88 (1954) (finding lack of neurological disorder

precluded a defense of insanity based on amnesia).
150. Thomas v. State, 201 Tenn. 645, 301 S.W.2d 358, 361 (1957).
151. Askew v. State, 118 So.2d 219, 222 (Fla. 1960) citing with approval, Cochran
v. State, 65 Fla. 91, 61 So. 187, 190 (1913).

152. See 4 W.

BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES

§ 24 (Lewis ed. 1898).
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It would be inhuman, and to a certain extent a denial of
the right of trial upon the merits, to require one who has been
disabled by the Act of God from intelligently making his defense to plead or be tried for his life or liberty. There may be
circumstances in all cases of which the defendant also has
knowledge which may prove his innocence, the advantage of
which, if insane to such an extent that he did not appreciate
the value of such facts, or the propriety of communicating
them to his counsel, he would be deprived.'5 3
The test applied by most courts in determining the mental capacity of a defendant to stand trial is whether the mental defect or disorder prevents the defendant from understanding the nature of the proceedings, or from cooperating with counsel, so that a rational defense
can be made. 54 This rule has been codified in the Model Penal Code,
which provides: "No person who as a result of mental disease or defect
lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in
his own defense shall be tried, convicted or sentenced for the commis55
sion of an offense so long as such incapacity endures.'
Courts have refused to hold that a defendant is incompetent to
stand trial solely because of amnesia. 56 Some courts have taken the
position that amnesia can never be an adequate ground for determining that an accused is unfit to stand trial. 57 Other courts have held
that amnesia is a factor to be considered in determining whether a defendant is unfit to stand trial,5 8 or can receive a fair trial.159
153. Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S.W. 327, 328 (1911).
154. See, e.g., Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
155. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
156. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Lombardi, 378 Mass. 612, 613-614, 393 N.E.2d 346,
348 (1978) (the virtually unanimous weight of authority in this country is that a defendant is not incompetent to stand trial simply because he suffers from amnesia); and
United States v. Borum, 464 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1972) (court found no case which held
the inability to recall the event charged because of amnesia constituted mental incapacity to stand trial).
157. Bradley v. Preston, 263 F. Supp. 283 (D.C. Dist. 1967) cert. denied, 390 U.S.
990 (this court has been unable to locate any case to support the contention that amnesia precludes mental capacity as a matter of law); State v. Pugh, 117 N.J. Super. 26, 283
A.2d 537 (1971) (amnesia concerning the crime does not bar prosecution).
158. E.g., Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (when a defendant
is suffering from amnesia preventing his recollection of alleged crimes, competency to
stand trial must be determined in light of whether a defendant can perform functions
essential to fairness and accuracy of trial); State v. Blake, 209 Kan. 196, 495 P.2d 905
(1972) (amnesia is a factor to be considered in determining whether a defendant is able
to meet the test of competency to stand trial).
159. E.g., United States v. Sullivan 406 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1969) (amnesia may call
for additional trial safeguards to guarantee a fair trial); People v. Francabandera, 33
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The first approach is exemplified by Commonwealth ex rel. Cummins v. Price,' in which the defendant denied any memory of the
events surrounding a murder. The court stated the general rule that to
be unable to stand trial, the defendant must be insane, or so mentally
ill that he or she cannot comprehend the accusation nor cooperate with
counsel to make a rational defense. 6 1 The court held that the defendant's amnesia as to acts occurring during the time of the murder did
not fall within this general rule."" At the time of arrest, the defendant
had suffered a gunshot wound to his head. The wound was alleged to
have been self-inflicted with the gun used to murder a woman found in
a car one-hundred feet from the accused. As a result of the head
wound, the defendant claimed no memory of the events surrounding
the murder. The court expressed concern that recognizing amnesia as a
ground for incompetency and a bar to trial would "turn over the determination of crime and criminal liability to psychiatrists, whose opinions are based in large part upon defendant's self-serving statement,
instead of to courts and jurors."' 3 This would "greatly jeopardize the
safety and security of law abiding citizens and render the protection of
society from crime and criminals far more difficult than ever before in
164
modern history.'
Some courts which have found defendants suffering from amnesia
fit to stand trial have identified extenuating circumstances which mitigated the adverse effects of amnesia in the particular cases before
them. In State v. Severns,'65 the Kansas Supreme Court found that the
defendant's amnesia occurred after an earlier trial which was set aside
on appeal. The court held that because the record of the first trial,
which included an account of facts forgotten by the defendant, was
available to the defendant and his counsel, the defendant was competent to stand trial. 16" In State v. Swails,' 7 the Louisiana Supreme
Court concluded that the defendant's amnesia did not render him incompetent, since he was pleading insanity at the time of the alleged

N.Y.2d 429, 310 N.E.2d 292, 354 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1974) (when a defendant claims inability
to stand trial because of amnesia, the court shall inquire whether the defendant may
receive a fair trial considering crime).
160. Commonwealth ex rel. Cummins v. Price, 421 Pa. 396, 218 A.2d 758, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 869 (1966).
161. Id. at 406, 218 A.2d at 763.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. State v. Severns, 184 Kan. 213, 336 P.2d 447 (1959).
166. Id. at 221-22, 336 P.2d at 454-55.
167. State v. Swails, 233 La. 751, 66 So.2d 796 (1953).
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crime, and was not pleading not guilty. Therefore, his lack of memory
of circumstances relating to the offense was irrelevant to his competence to stand trial. In United States v. Sermon,' a federal district
court found that although the defendant suffered from partial amnesia,
he was able to provide his counsel with sufficient factual information so
that counsel could develop a defense.
The military courts have been strict in their rejection of amnesia
as a basis for unfitness to stand trial. In United States v. Olvera,'6 9 the
Military Court of Appeals observed that to hold a defendant incompetent to stand trial because he suffered from amnesia would be tantamount to holding that amnesia negates criminal responsibility. The
court reasoned:
Concededly such an accused is at some disadvantage-for if innocent, he does not demonstrate that quality by testimony that
he 'blacked out' and does not remember. However, he is still
quite competent to assume the witness stand, and to assure the
court that he does not remember-and he is certainly able to
analyze rationally the probability of his having committed the
offense in light of his own knowledge of his character and
propensities. 7"
71
In United States v. Watson,1
the Military Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction for passing bad checks, despite his
claim of amnesia. The court observed that "the type of loss of memory
which might in and of itself raise a doubt as to capacity is a loss of
memory as to basic matters of general application, as the difference
between truth and falsehood, between the moral and immoral, not the
memory of particular events.' ' 7 2 The court reasoned that amnesia
would not cause the accused to lie to his counsel nor to intentionally
hold back facts or otherwise hinder his defense. 73 The court concluded
that amnesia would not prevent the defendant from understanding the
nature of his oath, from truthfully answering questions, nor from com74
prehending the elements of the offenses or the facts.
The leading case adopting the second approach, that amnesia is a
factor to be considered in determining whether a defendant is fit to

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

United States v. Sermon, 228 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
United States v. Olvera, 4 C.M.A. 134, 15 C.M.R. 134 (1954).
Id.
United States v. Watson, 18 C.M.R. 391 (1954).
Id. at 401.
Id.
Id.
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stand trial, is Wilson v. United States." ' The defendant's amnesia was
caused by brain injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The accident occurred during a high speed chase shortly after the bank robbery
with which the defendant was charged. The court identified six factors
to be considered in determining whether amnesia rendered the defendant unfit to stand trial:
(1)The extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant's
ability to consult with and assist his lawyer.
(2)The extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant's
ability to testify in his own behalf.
(3)The extent to which the evidence in suit could be extrinsically reconstructed in view of the defendant's amnesia. Such
evidence would include evidence relating to the crime itself as
well as any reasonably possible alibi.
(4)The extent to which the government assisted the defendant
and his counsel in the reconstruction.
(5)The strength of the prosecution's case. Most important,
whether the government's case is such as to negate all reasonable hypothesis of innocence. If there is any substantial possibility that the accused would, but for his amnesia, establish an
alibi or other defense, it should be presumed that he would
have been able to do so.
(6)Any other facts or circumstances which would indicate
17
whether or not the defendant has a fair trial.
A number of federal and state courts have adopted this case-bycase approach and consider the multiplicity of factors to determine
whether the defendant's amnesia renders him unfit to stand trial.'
Some courts have formulated the issue raised to be a question of
whether the defendant can be given a fair trial, instead of whether the
defendant is fit to stand trial. 17 1 When the amnesia is temporary, such
an approach leads courts to defer trial for a reasonable time, to give
the defendant an opportunity to recover his or her memory.'7 9 Where

175. United States v. Wilson, 391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
176. 391 F.2d at 463-4.
177. E.g., United States v. Sullivan, 406 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1969); State v. Blake, 209
Kan. 196, 495 P.2d 905 (1972); Commonwealth v. Lombardi, 378 Mass. 612, 393 N.E.2d
346 (1979); State v. Willard, 292 N.C. 567, 234 S.E.2d 587 (1977).
178. E.g, Commonwealth v. Lombardi, 378 Mass. 612, 393 N.E.2d 346 (1979) (defendants not entitled to dismissal of indictments based on incompetency because of amnesia at time of offense but it is proper for trial judge to determine fairness of trial in
light of amnesia before trial if possible, or after trial).
179. Id. at 615, 393 N.E.2d at 349 (1979).
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the amnesia appears to be permanent, this approach would not permit
the deferral of trial. In that case, deferral would not benefit the defendant, and could decrease the likelihood of a fair trial. 80 Under this
approach, the court decides on a case-by-case basis whether the defendant's amnesia precludes a fair trial. The factors to be considered
include the nature of the crime, the extent of the prosecutor's disclosure of facts to the defense, the quality and quantity of the state's evidence, and the nature of the defenses raised.'
While it can be argued that amnesia renders a defendant unable to
assist in his or her defense, amnesia alone is not sufficient to find a
defendant unfit to stand trial. Whether a court considers amnesia as a
factor in a fitness determination or focuses its inquiry on whether a
particular amnesic defendant can be provided a fair trial, the underlying concern is one of fairness as in all competency determinations, fairness inherently requires a case-by-case determination.
E.

Amnesia, Sentencing and the Death Penalty

The United States Supreme Court has held that:
[T]he eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the sentencer in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sen182
tence less than death.
A mitigating factor is an attribute of the defendant's character,
record, or offense that by its very nature "mitigate[s] against imposing
capital punishment" and calls for leniency in the capital sentencing decision. 8 ' The Court has listed some typical mitigating circumstances
such as "the youth of the offender, the absence of any prior conviction,
the influence of drugs, alcohol or extreme emotional disturbance, and
even the existence of circumstances which the offender reasonably believed provided a moral justification for his conduct."'" In Eddings v.
Oklahoma,188 the Court vacated the death sentence of a sixteen-yearold boy who had been convicted of first degree murder. The Court held

180. United States v. Swanson, 572 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 849 (1978) (amnesic defendant found able to consult with counsel and participate in

his defense).
181.
182.
183.

Swanson, 572 F.2d at 526-27.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 606-08.

184.

Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 (1977).

185.

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
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that the refusal to consider the minor's unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance as mitigating factors violated the defendant's eighth
and fourteenth amendment rights.'86
The Model Penal Code recognizes mental disability as a mitigating
7
factor to be considered by a court Considering a death sentence.
Many states expressly provide that evidence of mental disability is a
mitigating factor against the imposition of the death penalty.' 8 Others
provide for consideration of mitigating factors without providing a list
of such factors.1' 9 These latter provisions have been given liberal construction by courts, making it clear that mental disability is properly
considered as a mitigating factor under all state statutes.'
More broadly, mental disability has been recognized as a mitigating factor for all criminal sentences. For example, the Model Sentencing and Correction Act of the Uniform Law Commissioners provides:
"If appropriate for the defense, mitigating factors may include: ... the
defendant was suffering from a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced his culpability for the offense."'' 1 Similarly, the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 provides that the United
States Sentencing Commission is to develop guidelines for sentencing
which include as a mitigating factor, the "mental and emotional condition to the extent that such condition mitigates the defendant's culpability or to the extent that such condition is otherwise plainly
relevant."' 2
Amnesia at the time of an offense is a mental condition qualifying
as a mitigating factor in sentencing where the amnesia has affected the
defendant's understanding of what he or she was doing or the justification for the conduct. Even those courts which have rejected defenses
based on amnesia have found it to be a factor in sentencing. For exam-

186. Id. at 116.
187. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(g) (Proposed Official Draft 1962): "At the time
of murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a
result of mental disease or defect or intoxication."
188. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.141(6)(b), (c) (West 1982) and OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.04(B)(3), (7) (Page 1982).
189. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1982) and OKLA. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10
(1982).
190. E.g., Rex v. State, 242 Ga. 876, 252 S.E.2d 383 (1979) and Louisiana v. Price,
403 So.2d 660 (La. Sup. Ct. 1981).
191. MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT § 3-108(9) (Uniform Law Commissioners 1979). See generally TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 44-45 (1975).
192. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, H.J. Res. 648, P.L. 98-473
§ 994(a)(4) (October 12, 1984).
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ple, in Commonwealth ex rel. Cummins v. Price,193 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court observed that: "[The defendant's] amnesia is not admissible to prove innocence or guilt. However, it is a circumstance
which the judge or the jury may consider in determining the penalty, if
they believe it to exist."' 94
Where a defendant suffered from amnesia at the time of an offense, its relevance to sentencing rests upon its effect on the defendant.
The amnesia must have produced a mistaken understanding of the
conduct, in the justification for the action, or the legality or wrongfulness of the action. Thus, amnesia at the time of an offense presents an
issue of culpability.
On the other hand, amnesia at the time of trial and sentencing
raises an issue of the utility of punishment. Where a defendant lacks
memory of the offense and is unlikely to engage in similar conduct in
the future, a reduction in sentence may be justified. The sentencing
authority may consider the lack of a need for special deterrence or incapacitation as persuasive in such a reduction. However, this approach
may reduce the general deterrent effect of punishment, since others
may consider the possibility of feigning amnesia when contemplating
the commission of an offense. This approach may also limit the special
deterrent effect of punishment, since the defendant's present ability to
understand the significance of the punishment is not diminished by
amnesia.
In the context of sentencing, the significance of amnesia is similar
to that of insanity or diminished capacity; it reduces the culpability of
the offender. Where amnesia causes misunderstanding of the nature
and meaning of what one is doing, that person is not fully responsible
for the conduct. Consequently, the accused is not to be held to the full
measure of punishment which would otherwise be imposed.
III.

CONCLUSION

Amnesia is a condition which results from a range of causes and
takes a variety of forms. The most significant form for the criminal law
is psychogenic or psychic amnesia occurring at the time of an offense.
Such amnesia may provide a basis for establishing that the defendant
lacked the requisite mental state for the offense charged. Similarly, the
existence of amnesia at the time of an offense may provide a basis for
the insanity defense or a defense based on diminished capacity. Such
defenses are valid provided the amnesia resulted in a disease or defect

193. Commonwealth ex rel. Cummins v. Price, 421 Pa. 396, 218 A.2d 758, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 869 (1966).
194. 421 Pa. at 403.
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that caused the defendant to lack the requisite intent for the charged
offense or to lack understanding of what he or she was doing, or that it
was wrong. Amnesia per se will usually not render a defendant unfit to
stand trial. Many courts, however, consider it a factor to be taken into
account in deciding the issue of competency or in determining whether
a defendant can obtain a fair trial. Most jurisdictions provide that
mental disorder is a basis for mitigating against any sentence, especially the death sentence. Amnesia at the time of an offense is a factor
to be taken into account in mitigating a sentence where the amnesia
affected the defendant's ability to understand the nature and meaning
of the conduct giving rise to the criminal charge.

